Dewey, Hook and Rorty on Pragmatism and Relativism

H.G. Callaway

(Draft of January 20, 2024)

(1,995ww +footnotes and References)

Abstract

Under the influence of the revival, or with prevalent acquiescence of the reviving pragmatic tradition, “corrosive” moral and epistemic skepticism have taken the form of doctrinaire relativism,(1) and this relativism, suggesting the futility of any set, common standards of judgment, has typically been conflated with pluralism. Hilary Putnam in particular has taken some considerable

pains to distinguish the Jamesian pluralism which he defends from the varieties of relativism which he rejects.(2) There has been an intensive politicalization and polarization of the American academy and American society which threatens to outrun our available, ameliorative political competence. On the plausible assumption that relativism is a variety of “power philosophy” to use Bertrand Russell’s term, in which “human beings occupy the imagination” and that it is “the power of the community that is felt to be valuable,”(3) it is readily and frequently assumed that

standards of judgment and evaluation only make sense against the background of some existing social-political purpose and framework. In consequence of this concept, politics becomes simply an action-oriented, often unrestrained competition for political, social and economic power.

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1. See my analysis and criticism of contemporary doctrinaire relativism, “What’s Wrong with Relativism: A Political-Ethical Analysis of Extreme Ethical Skepticism,” in Callaway 2017, Pluralism, Pragmatism and American Democracy, pp. 233-252.

2. Philosopher Edward Craig remarked regarding “pluralism” in a short encyclopedia entry that “Its commonest use in late twentieth-century philosophy is to describe views which recognize many sets of equally correct belief or evaluative standards, and in this sense it is akin to ‘relativism’.” See Edward

Craig 2000, “Pluralism,” in The Concise Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, p. 683. Cf. Hilary Putnam 2006, “Joseph Margolis on Relativism and Pluralism,” in Putnam 2022, Philosophy as Dialogue, pp. 223-234.

3. See Bertrand Russell 1945, A History of Western Philosophy, and Russell’s critical discussion of John Dewey’s philosophy of instrumentalism. Such a “power philosophy,” according to Russell, may eventuate in the notion that the community is free of every external constraint in its development and

expression and that any cognitive constraint counts as politically unreal or unfeasible.

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However, the ruling factor of relativism’s politicalization is the quasi-Hegelian notion of the purely conventional absence of reality in various alternative evaluative standards or frameworks.

1. Dewey, Sidney Hook and relational judgment

In some considerable contrast to Russell’s negative image, Dewey’s usage of the term “relativism,” which he links to pragmatism and his own instrumentalism, is a matter of the evolving and emergent standards of judgment provided by the sciences and by disciplinary inquiry generally. He was aware of the rejection of relativism “identified with a lack of standards, and consequently with the tendency to promote chaos,” but he rejects the charge against his own philosophy by

emphasis on how inquiry itself provides standards of judgment.4 Notice that this is far from claiming that recognized and accepted standards already exist suited to the evaluation of competing and/or proposed resolutions to any, and all outstanding conflicts, questions or problems.

It is helpful to compare Dewey’s position on the issue with that of Sidney Hook (1902-1989). In his 1961 book, The Quest for Being. Hook makes it clear that “The opposite of ‘relative’ is not ‘objective’ but ‘absolute’ or ‘unconditioned.’”5 In the sense that Dewey and Hook accept judgments as “relative,” what is claimed is just that value judgments are relational. According to

Hook, pernicious notions of relativism rest on a confusion of two different problems. “The first is whether values have objective status and validity; the second is whether in case of conflict, objective values and the interests to which they are related, can be shared... ;” and according to Hook, “one can hold to the belief in the objectivity of values without guarantying that agreement about conflicting values, ... can be won;” and “how far such agreement can be won cannot before told until a actual investigation into the conditions and consequences of value claims in definite situations is undertaken... .”(6)

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4. The point is that new and fruitful standards arise in the course of successful inquiry. See Dewey

1946, “Introduction to Problems of Men,” pp. 162-163. See also John Dewey and James H. Tufts 1932,

Ethics, reprinted in Jo Ann Boydston ed. 1985, John Dewey, The Later Works, vol. 7, p. 335-336.

5. Sidney Hook 1961, The Quest for Being, p. 206.

6. Hook 1961, The Quest for Being, pp. 206-207.

(Page 3)

For Hook, Dewey’s most famous student and advocate, the seemingly arbitrary doctrine of relativism becomes a relational account of judgment. This position is reiterated in Hook’s 1987 book, Paradoxes of Freedom. Situations of persistent, unresolved conflict do not show that “the moral values at issue are devoid of objectivity but that

they lack universality, not that they are relativistic, in the sense that they are arbitrary and subjective,

but that they are relational... .7 It is worth reflecting, though, that under conditions of rapid social,

economic and technological change, the available means for amelioration of value conflicts,

including political competence and the institutions of basic social-political inquiry, may prove

insufficient for effectively dealing with the sheer number and complexity of rapidly emerging

problems.

2. Putnam, Rorty and James on truth

In recent decades, we have seen a growth of divisiveness and growing economic inequalities at

home and abroad, linked with uncritical acceptance of globalization, multiculturalism, identity

politics and a prevalent rejection and/or ignorance of historical American ideals. This effect is to

be expected given that competition for power is understood to be a zero-sum game: an increase

of the power of one demographic group implies a decrease in the power of some competing

group(s). From the present perspective, ignorance and distortion of American ideals is central in

contemporary American moral and political disorientation, dysfunction and decline.

A country shorn of the knowledge of its own intellectual, moral and political history is like a

person who has lost all memory and who can consequently muster no decided preferences or

expectations about the future. The critical perspective is that contemporary pragmatism has too

often been shorn of its much needed contextual relation to American history and values. Putnam,

though clearly influenced by the pragmatic tradition and first of all by William James, also came

to say that he “does not normally call [him]self a pragmatist, or any kind of ‘ist’,” and he is especially

adverse to the assimilation of his views to those of his “philosophical opponent,” Richard

Rorty.8 This is due in no small part to prevalent confusions and conflicts concerning the meaning

of the word “pragmatic.”9 Putnam also stresses that his admiration for the classical pragmatists

“does not extend to any of the different theories of truth that Peirce, James and Dewey

7. Sidney Hook 1987, Paradoxes of Freedom. See p. 127.

8. Hilary Putnam 2012, Philosophy in an Age of Science, p. 70.

9. Cf. Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 11th ed. “Pragmatic”: (entry 2) relating to matters of

fact or practical affairs often to the exclusion of intellectual or artistic matters. Example of usage:

“Pragmatic men of power have had no time or inclination to deal with ... social morality.”

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advanced.”10 Putnam’s positions are understandable, for instance, in light of Rorty’s interpretations

of Dewey and James.

According to Rorty, Dewey holds to a “pragmatist theory of truth” which derives from

William James; and “that theory substitutes expediency for accuracy or concreteness as a term of

epistemic approbation;” and for Rorty, this is the form of pragmatic theory according to which

“‘the true’ ... is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as ‘the right’ is only the expedient

in our way of behaving.”11 But the flat-footed equation of “the true” with expediency is just

the kind of claim that most embarrasses American thought and American civilization; and moreover,

it ignores James’s qualification of his quoted claim—and Rorty’s interpretation of the

pragmatists fails to stand up to broader examination. It is fairly well known that in his 1938

Logic, The Theory of Inquiry, Dewey accepted Peirce’s account of truth as the best known to

him.12

It is as though the appeal to expediency is the disreputable twin of pragmatism—officially

repudiated—but a persistent, “zombie,” or “undead” doctrine in practice in some related

circles—typically manifesting as pernicious, unprincipled relativism and habits of “professional”

dissimulation. This is just the sort of “power philosophy” which Russell criticized and (falsely)

attributed to Dewey.

3. Conclusion: expediency, relativism and instrumentalism

Russell’s aversion to “power philosophy” is plausibly understood to belong to his philosophical

reaction to a British establishment which jailed him for his opposition to World War I., and later

often excluded him from regular academic employment. He came to view himself as an outsider

and eventually a dedicated “ban the bomb” dissident. What is perhaps more surprising is that by

1945, and as he wrote his History of Western Philosophy, he came to see Dewey and instrumentalism

as representing an American power philosophy. At the least, this may be surprising to all

those who became aware of Dewey and the pragmatic tradition in American philosophy during

the long, post-World War II. period of the dominance of British and American analytic philoso-

10. Putnam 2012, Philosophy in an Age of Science, p. 70.

11. Richard Rorty 1995, “Dewey between Hegel and Darwin,” p. 4 in Herman J. Saatkamp ed. 1995,

Rorty and Pragmatism, The Philosopher Responds to his Critics. Cf. William James 1907, Pragmatism;

reprinted 1974, see p. 145.

12. John Dewey 1938, Logic, The Theory of Inquiry; reprinted in Boydston, Jo Ann ed. 1986, John

Dewey, The Later Works, vol. 12, see p. 343.

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phy. Though Russell saw himself as close to philosophical themes from William James early in

his career, by the time he published his “William James Lectures” (Harvard 1940) James was

never mentioned in the published volume.13 Russell clearly had several identifiable motives to

distance himself from the pragmatic tradition.

Seeing pernicious, doctrinaire relativism as a Russellian, power philosophy, defenders of the

revival of the pragmatist tradition might be expected to reject such relativism. But tolerance of

Margolis’s relativism has been prominent among contemporary scholars of the pragmatic tradition.

14 He received several awards and recognition from the (pragmatist dominated) Society for

the Advancement of American Philosophy. However, themes and theses of Putnam’s later

thought are of special interest in this context of discussions and debate. For example it appears

somewhat anomalous that Putnam devoted so much time and energy to his discussions of Rorty’s

writings. On the other hand, Putnam is much briefer regarding the version of relativism long and

explicitly promoted by Joseph Margolis.15 Russell’s critical view of Dewey’s instrumentalism as

a power philosophy makes Rorty’s appeal to expediency poignant for present purposes; and

much the same is true of Putnam’s considered judgment of Rorty’s interpretation of the classical

pragmatists. In evaluation of Rorty’s views, Putnam wrote that “in replying to the accusation of

being a relativist about truth, Rorty defends an explicit relativization of warranted assertability to

cultures” which Putnam regards as “self refuting.”16 Recall here Putnam’s Pragmatism: an Open

Question, where the basis of evaluation of the revival largely turns on the question of “... whether

an enlightened society can avoid a corrosive moral skepticism without tumbling back into moral

authoritarianism.”17 Analysis of contemporary social and political problems strongly suggest that

“corrosive moral skepticism” and “moral authoritarianism” have risen and increased together;

and the pernicious relativism in the revival, whether explicitly formulated or as subterranean

practice has only added fuel to the social-political fires.

13. See Bertrand Russell 1950, An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, The William James Lectures

for 1940.

14. A notable exception is Susan Haack. See, e.g., Haack 1998, Manifesto of a Passionate Moderate,

especially Chapter Nine, “Reflections on Relativism,” pp. 149-166.

15. See, for instance, Joseph Margolis 1991, The Truth about Relativism; and Joseph Margolis 2006,

“Hilary Putnam and the Promise of Pluralism.”

16. Putnam 2006, “Joseph Margolis on Relativism and Pluralism,” p. 224. Cf. Richard Rorty 1993,

“Putnam and the Relativist Menace,” p. 450.

17. Hilary Putnam 1995, Pragmatism, An Open Question, p. 2.

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Putnam remained skeptical and unattracted by Margolis’s “robust relativism” on grounds of

his own common-sense and scientific realism. His arguments parallel those sketched above from

Dewey and Hook.

... what we call ethics does not rest on a “foundation” in the usual philosopher’s sense, but on a

complicated set of human interests which, moreover sometimes conflict. The objectivity of a

warrantedly assertible ethical judgment is the objectivity of reasonable solutions to problems of

interpreting and reconciling and satisfying such interests. Such reasonable solutions need not

have what preference theorist call a “complete ordering” with respect to the interests in

question; but complete ordering does not seem to me something that a modest objectivism in

ethics requires.18

It suffices on Putnam’s approach to “objectivity” or scientific realism regarding ethical claims

that we are sometimes able to show the “better and worse” of particular ethical claims in relation

to pre-existing and prospective interests. This does not require demonstrating in every case the

superiority of one existing ethical claim over another, conflicting alternative. Putnam remained

unconvinced that Margolis offered a “clear and coherent version” of relativism.19

Putnam’s skeptical perspective is only amplified when one considers that Margolis’s relativism

purports to be consistent with what he calls “cultural realism.”20 The key to understanding

and evaluating this turn of argumentation in Margolis’s writings is to appreciate its quasi-

Kantian character—and the “dialectical” relations of Kantian and Hegelian themes in German

and continental philosophy.

Margolis’s relativism is closer to Hegelian themes where only the absolute totality, the

utterly “unconditioned” is true and real: the real is the ideal totality. Anything less is mere

appearance. But it is well known that Hegel’s Absolute idealism developed out of criticism of

Kant and J. G. Fichte. In Kantian epistemology, the world as it appears to us involves a fixed set

of categories together with space and time as “forms of intuition.” Appearances are not to be

identified as “things in themselves,” as they might exist independent of, or out of all relation to

the categories and forms of intuition, but for Kant, appearances still count as “empirically real.”

Giving up the Kantian fixity, one may arrive at the notion that what is “empirically real” is

conditioned by historically variable and mutable conceptual systems which differ from time to

time and from one cultural locality to another. This quasi-Kantian notion of reality is what

18. Putnam 2006, “Joseph Margolis: On Relativism and Pluralism,” pp. 230-231.

19. Putnam 2006, “Joseph Margolis: On Relativism and Pluralism,” p. 223.

20. See Joseph Margolis 2001, Selves and Other Texts: The Case for Cultural Realism.

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Margolis calls “culturally real.” In consequence, recognizing the “cultural real” is merely a step

toward demoting such quasi-Kantian realities to “patronized” posits and the unreal, because

incomplete Hegelian illusions—or “false consciousness.” Following similar steps and arguments

from William James, Putnam explains his turn away from Kantian models including his own

early “internal realism.”21

References:

Callaway, H.G. (2017) “What’s Wrong with Relativism? A Political-Ethical Analysis of Extreme Ethical

Skepticism,” in Callaway (2017) Pluralism, Pragmatism and American Democracy. Newcastle,

U.K.: Cambridge Scholars, pp. 233-252.

Craig, Edward (2000) “Pluralism,” in The Concise Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London; New

York: Routledge, p. 683.

Dewey, John (1938) Logic, The Theory of Inquiry. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston; reprinted in

Boydston, Jo Ann ed. (1986) John Dewey, The Later Works. Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL:

Southern Illinois University Press), vol. 12.

— (1946) “Introduction to Problems of Men,” reprinted in Boydston, Jo Ann ed. (1989) John Dewey, The

Later Works. Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, vol. 15, pp.

154-169.

Dewey, John and James H. Tufts (1932) Ethics, reprinted in Jo Ann Boydston ed. (1985) John Dewey,

The Later Works (Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL: Southern Illinois University Press), vol. 7.

Haack, Susan (1998) Manifesto of a Passionate Moderate. Chicago; London: University of Chicago

Press.

Hook, Sidney (1961) The Quest for Being. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus.

— (1987) Paradoxes of Freedom. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus.

James, William (1907) Pragmatism. New York: Longmans, Green; reprinted (1974) New York: New

American Library.

Margolis, Joseph (1991) The Truth about Relativism. Oxford: Blackwell.

— (2006) “Hilary Putnam and the Promise of Pluralism,” Contemporary Pragmatism vol. 3, no. 2, pp.

15-25.

— (2001) Selves and Other Texts: The Case for Cultural Realism. Penn State University Press.

21. The crucial turn toward Putnam’s later philosophy and his developing realism came in 1990 and

was expressed in print in 1994. See the explanatory note on Putnam 2006, “Joseph Margolis: On Relativism

and Pluralism,” p. 234. In Hilary Putnam 1987, The Many Faces of Realism, the author persisted in

his defense of the quasi-Kantian thesis of “internal realism.”

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Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 11th ed. Springfield, MA: Merriam Webster.

Putnam, Hilary (1987) The Many Faces of Realism. LaSalle, IL: Open Court.

— (1995) Pragmatism, An Open Question. Oxford: Blackwell.

— (2006) “Joseph Margolis on Relativism and Pluralism,” in Putnam (2022) Philosophy as Dialogue.

Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, pp. 223-234.

— (2012) Philosophy in an Age of Science. De Caro, Mario and David Macarthur eds. Cambridge, MA;

London: Harvard University Press.

Rorty, Richard (1993) “Putnam and the Relativist Menace,” Journal of Philosophy vol. 90, pp. 443-461.

— (1995) “Dewey between Hegel and Darwin,” in Herman J. Saatkamp ed. (1995) Rorty and

Pragmatism, The Philosopher Responds to his Critics. Nashville, TN; London: Vanderbilt

University Press, pp. 1-15.

Russell, Bertrand (1945) A History of Western Philosophy. New York: Simon and Schuster.

— (1950) An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, The William James Lectures for 1940. London:

George Allen & Unwin.